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The essay examines Spain’s colonial legacy in the long run development of Spanish America. It surveys the 
fiscal and constitutional outcomes of independence and assesses the relative burden imposed by colonialism. 
Constitutional asymmetries between revenue collecting and spending agents constrained de facto 
governments’ power to tax. Inherent disparities embedded in colonial fiscal system worsened with vaguely 
defined representation for subjects and territories and troubled their aggregation into a modern representative 
polity.  Governments with limited fiscal capacity failed to deliver public goods and to equitably distribute 
costs and benefits of independence. Growing indirect taxes, debt and money creation allowed them to 
transfer the fiscal burden to other constituents or future generations. Taxpayers realised the asymmetry 
between private contributions and public goods and hence favoured a low but regressive taxation. 
Comparisons with trajectories in the metropolis and the US are offered to qualify this legacy.  
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Mexico	 7.90	 11.60	 6.13	 9.15	 5.62	 11.14	 2.57	 6.94	
Chile	 1.71	 5.25	 1.21	 5.11	 1.40	 2.80	 1.28	 2.78	
River	
Plate	
6.90	 8.42	 3.16	 4.29	 5.38	 7.67	 4.87	 7.16	
Bolivia	 5.47	 6.25	 4.31 4.33 3.85 4.14 1.85	 1.73
Peru		 5.39	 3.51	 4.49	 2.28	 3.80	 3.09	 2.98	 2.00	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	










































Arequipa															(Peru)	 5.39 3.87 ‐3.34	 37,721
Cuzco																					(Peru)	 12.15 7.56 ‐5.17	 32,082
Huamanga												(Peru)	 6.80 4.49 ‐5.03	 25,970
Lima																							(Peru)	 5.24 8.87 6.67	 201,259
Trujillo																			(Peru)	 18.13 12.15 ‐10.22	 17,700
Guayaquil														(Ecuador)	 4.06 3.53 n.a	 39,045
La	Paz																					(Bolivia)	 12.32 3.47 ‐5.72	 40,000
Potosi																					(Bolivia)	 18.29 17.03 4.75	 35,000
Concepcion										(Chile)	 5.23 2.76 n.a	 105,114
Chiloe																					(Chile)	 4.38 4.50 n.a	 26,703
Mendoza															(Chile)	 4.61 1.46 ‐0.16	 8,765
Santiago																(Chile)	 9.26 4.28 n.a	 203,732
Buenos	Aires							(River	Plate)	 16.40 28.44 19.85	 72,165
Montevideo										(River	Plate)	 40.31 49 7.32	 14,093
Paraguay															(River	Plate)	 1.03 1.07 0.27	 100,000
Salta																								(River	Plate)	 4.58 3.98 n.a	 13,528
Santa	Fe																	(River	Plate)	 0.07 1.63 ‐0.11	 12,600
Durango																(Mexico)	 2.95 0.24 ‐2.54	 157,970
Guadalajara										(Mexico)	 1.57 0.20 ‐1.21	 623,572
Guanajuato												(Mexico)	 2.36 0.15 ‐1.74	 511,616
Merida																				(Mexico)	 1.06 0.62 n.a	 460,620
Mexico																				(Mexico)	 24.41 24.85 ‐2.81	 1,495,140
Oaxaca																				(Mexico)	 0.92 0.09 ‐0.51	 528,860
Puebla																					(Mexico)	 1.36 0.46 ‐0.09	 821,277
SL	Potosi																(Mexico)	 2.83 0.16 ‐2.68	 311,503
Veracruz																	(Mexico)	 14.35 20.54 2.29	 154,286






















































































































































































































































































Chile		 1800 	 5.11* 	
	 1835	 2003421 1010332 1.98 	
	 1843	 3063568	 1038801 	 2.94	 	
Mexico																1800												 	 	 	 9.15*	 **	
	 1825	 8567954	 6500000 	 1.31	 11.64	
	 1827	 15173469	 8000000 	 1.89	 1.51	
	 1830	 17776870	 7996000 	 2.22	 2.36	
	 1831	 16040591	 6382284 	 2.51	 2.22	
	 1834	 17737883	 7734292 	 2.29	 3.48	
	 1842	 18865148 7015509 2.68 2.7	
	 1844	 22194712 7000000 3.17 3.63	
	 1841‐44	 19262682	 7015509 	 2.74	 4.46	







BuenosAires		 1800	 2782669a	 72615	 	 	38.55*	 38.55	
	 1819	 2408242b	 125000 19.26 19.26	
	 1829	 7915579 153000 51.73 13.90	
Bolivia	 1800	 	 	 	 4.33*	 	
	 1827	 1867041	 1100000 	 1.69	 	
	 1846	 2363034	 1378896 	 1.71	 	
Peru		 1800	 	 	 	 2.28*	 1.73	
	 1826	 3346032	 1500000 	 2.23	 1.98	
	 1830	 3003489	 1249723 	 2.40	 2.40	
	 1831	 3526148	 1373736 	 2.56	 2.65	
	 1846	 5515591	 1373736 	 4.01	 4.93	




Durango	 1800	 	 	 	 2.95*	
	 1825‐26	 312479	 120157	 	 2.60	 	
	 1833	 391091	 139081	 	 2.81	 	
Mexico		 1826‐27	 892130	 829458	 	 1.07	 	
	 1833‐34	 728270	 1039758 	 0.70	 	
Guanajuato	 1800	 	 	 	 2.36*	
	 1829	 733444	 442916	 	 1.65	 	




	 1830	 614858	 656881	 	 0.93	 	
	 1831	 505443	 660595	 	 0.76	 	
	 1834	 532600	 680000	 	 0.78	 	
Puebla	 1800	 	 	 	 1.36*	
	 1825	 405618	 584358	 	 0.69	 	
S.Luis	Potosi	 1800	 	 	 	 	2.83*	
	 1828	 470050	 297593	 	 1.57	 	
	 1830	 448500	 310196	 	 1.44	 	
Veracruz	 1830	 241659 242658 0.99 	
Zacatecas	 1800 	 9.04*
	 1825	 620018	 247295	 	 2.50	 	
	 1826	 689032	 272901	 	 2.52	 	
	 1830	 844049	 274537	 	 3.07	 	
	 1832	 1476757	 314121	 	 4.70	 	
Notes:	*	data	from	annual	average	‘net	per	capita	revenues’	1796‐1800	Ibid	table	2;	**	Mexico	
adjusted	by	annual	CPI	value	in	silver	grains	index	from	(Challu	and	Gomez	Galvarriato	2015),	***	
Peru:	adjusted	by	annual	inflation	index	from	(Gootenberg	1990	table	3);	a)	Annual	average	net	per	
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capita	revenue	for	Buenos	Aires	only,	b)	data	for	1822	(Burgin	table	7)*	M.	Burgin,	The	Economic	
Aspects	of	Argentine	Federalism,	1820‐1850	(Cambridge,	1947)p	53	
	
Back	in	1989	Jacobsen	had	estimated	that	per	capita	collection	of	revenues	in	Peru	had	
fallen	from	“28.9	reals	in	the	mid‐1790s	to	23.3	reals	in	1850”.	This	nearly	20%	reduction	
in	the	nominal	value	of	the	collection	represented	about	43%	in	real	terms	as	he	assumed	
“a	30	%	inflation	rate	for	the	period	1800s	and	1850s”	(Jacobsen	1989)p	315).	More	recent	
data	shows	successive	cycles	of	deflation	and	inflation	as	result	of	lower	levels	of	silver	in	
circulation	and	inflationary	financing	of	wars	before	the	Guano	boom	(Gootenberg	1990,	
28‐30).	This	explains	the	relatively	higher	tax	burden	of	the	1840s.	Otherwise,	like	in	
Mexico	the	tax	take	of	the	republican	government	was	a	fraction	of	the	colonial	burden	in	
spite	of	moderate	price	inflation	(Challu	Gomez	Galvarriato	2015).			
In	Spain,	the	Mon	Santillan	1843‐45	reforms	–	together	with	a	new	constitution‐	abolished	
internal	customs	by	the	discontinuation	of	alcabalas;	exemptions	and	tax	farming	still	in	
hands	of	the	church	and	individuals	ceased	granting	a	slightly	greater	control	to	the	central	
government	(Serrano	2015/2009).	Yet	still	in	the	1850s	the	bulk	of	revenues	originated	in	
Custom,	monopolies	and	a	other	consumption	taxes	(Yun	Casalilla,	O'Brien	et	al.	2012).	A	
new	direct	tax	‘contribución	territorial’	did	not	yield;	this	ill‐defined	levy	on	land	property	
(not	on	income	or	capital)	left	the	valuation	and	collection	of	taxes	in	the	hands	of	
ayuntamientos.	Various	disentailments	of	royal	and	Church	real	estate	(1811,	1836‐37,	
1841,	1855)	to	pay	for	old	debts	or	paid	with	depreciated	scrip	provided	some	occasional	
income.	But	as	in	Spanish	America	large	sales	of	lands	distorted	land	markets	and	fostered	
concentration	of	assets.		
Everywhere	‘Liberals	and	Absolutist’	(or	conservative)	governments	alike	faced	the	same	
fiscal	problems	and	resolved	them	very	much	in	the	same	fashion:	repeated	insolvency,	
further	indebtedness	and	further	indirect	taxes19.	This	was	not	a	matter	of	politics	or	
ideologies.	In	Buenos	Aires	for	instance	the	same	individual	Manuel	Garcia	was	responsible	
of	the	Finances	for	fifteen	years	and	served	under	diametrically	different	governments	–in	
the	eyes	of	political	historians	‐	that	of	Rivadavia	and	Rosas	(Irigoin	2000).	Yet	frequent	
change	of	governments	in	both	former	colonies	and	metropolis	are	a	symptom	of	
protracted	instability.	But	changes	in	the	responsible	of	the	Treasury	intimate	that	this	was	
far	from	a	legacy	of	colonialism.	Between	1827	and	1855	Mexico	had	49	different	
governments	and	119	ministers	of	finance,	who	lasted	in	office	an	average	of	4	months	if	
the	government	was	constitutionally	appointed,	or	barely	3	weeks	in	the	facto	regimes.	In	
                                                            
19	In	Spain	the	government	unilaterally	restructured	the	debt	as	in	1818,	repudiated	(partly)	it	in	1828,	
defaulted	or	nearly	defaulted	in	1836	and	1847.	
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the	metropolis,	between	the	French	withdrawal	in	1814	and	the	1868	revolution,	there	
were	54	cabinets	and	92	different	ministers	of	Finances20.		
Indeed	both	Spanish	and	Spanish	American	governments	became	insolvent	in	the	wake	of	
the	crisis	following	the	Napoleonic	occupation	of	Spain;	and	their	commercial	and	fiscal	
deficits	continued	sternly	(Comin	1988).	Both	colonies	and	metropolis	amassed	huge	
domestic	debts	and	borrowed	heavily	in	European	capital	markets;	cash	strapped	Spanish	
American	republics	found	ready	money	in	London	in	the	1820s	–	and	applied	fresh	funds	to	
make	the	reforms	viable;	within	few	years	all	them	defaulted	and	remained	sealed	off	from	
further	foreign	borrowing	for	the	next	forty	years	(Marichal	1989).Only	when	governments	
could	restore	some	soundness	to	their	treasuries,	they	became	again	credible	borrowers	in	
London.		Spanish	governments	could	do	slightly	better:	they	repeatedly	defaulted	or	
repudiated	the	domestic	debt	(1836,	1840)	(Tedde	de	Lorca	and	Marichal	1994)	p	64).	
Spain	too	could	borrow	in	London	in	the	1820s	–	and	in	France	in	the	early	1830s;	adding	
this	debt	to	the	arrears	from	the	Dutch	loans	of	the	1800s	(Canga	Arguelles	1833)‐	but	lost	
direct	access	to	foreign	finance	in	the	late	1830s	(Platt	1983)	p124).	Thereafter	the	
government	could	only	survive	with	short	run	lending	from	the	house	of	Rothschild	–	but	at	
a	significant	fiscal	cost:	the	loss	of	revenues	from	one	of	the	world’s	most	important	
quicksilver	deposits21.		
Taxation	without	consent	
In	the	1820s	most	of	the	republics	also	consolidated	the	debt	–including	arrears	from	old	
colonial	claims.	In	Mexico	by	1816	it	represented	120%	of	the	total	revenues	of	the	
Mexican	treasury	in	the	bountiful	years	of	1800s;	the	proportion	was	300%	for	Lima	in	
1821	and	150%	in	Buenos	Aires22.	The	three	treasuries	had	been	large	recipients	of	
transfers	before	1810	so	without	these	extra‐revenues	the	debt	burden	was	several	times	
larger	in	the	1820s	[Grafe	Irigoin	2012	p	629].	As	part	of	the	reforms	some	republican	
governments	launched	their	first	public	debt	issues.	Early	on	Buenos	Aires	chartered	a	
private	bank	of	issue	and	established	a	Stock	Exchange	as	marketplace	for	public	funds	and	
                                                            
20	Numbers	count	the	ministers,	some	individual	names	repeated	in	the	post.		For	Mexico	Stevens,	D.	(1991).	
Origins	of	Instability	in	Early	Republican	Mexico.	Durhan,	Duke	University	Press.	
	 		for	Spain:	Urquijo	Goitia,JR		Diccionario	Biografico	de	los	ministros	espanoles	en	la	edad	
contemporanea	(1808‐2000)	www.ih.csic.es/lineas/jurg/diccionario/index_dic.htm	accessed	January	2015		
21	In	1835	Almaden’	mines	were	leased	to	Rothschild.		Mercury	was	a	critical	input	for	the	refining	of	silver	
and	the	house	controlled	the	refining	of	precious	metals	in	Paris	and	London	which	made	it	dominant	in	the	
exchange	business	in	Europe.	Lopez	Morell,	M.	(2013).	The	House	of	Rothschild	in	Spain,	1812‐1941.	
Burlington,	Ashgate.	
	 ,	p83	fig.12.10)				
22	The	amount	of	the	certified	debt	was	21.6	million	pesos	in	Mexico,	21.7	millions	in	Peru	and	4	million	in	
Buenos	Aires	(Grafe	Irigoin	2012).	Using	Coatsworth’	1998	GDP	data	these	stand	at	10%	of	Mexican	GDP,	
50%	of	Peru’s	GDP	and	16%	of	Argentina’	GDP.	Spain’	amounted	to	13,120	million	reals	but	60%	of	it	was	
repudiated	by	the	government	in	1828	(Tedde	1994	p12)	
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foreign	exchange.	The	funded	debt	in	1821	amounted	to	twice	as	much	as	the	yearly	
treasury	revenue	at	the	time.	By	1840	it	had	multiplied	ten‐fold	as	it	helped	to	fund	the	
Customs	shortfall	from	European	blockades	to	the	port.	Unsurprisingly	bonds	as	financial	
resource	vanished;	a	20	times	increase	in	the	volume	of	the	fiduciary	currency	issued	by	
the	bank	and	a	subsequent		depreciation	of	the	exchange	rate	to	gold	that	fell	from	17	to	
370	pesos	in	the	same	period	annihilated	the	domestic	market	for	government	debt	
(Irigoin	2000).			
Spain’s	domestic	debt	by	1821	–	which	included	the	principal	and	arrears	of	the	failed	
Vales	Reales‐	represented	about	the	same	amount	that	annual	revenues	(Tedde	1999,	12,	
Prados	1993,	Table	10).	Then	the	metropolis	had	lost	the	fiscal	returns	from	re‐exports	of	
other	European	goods	to	the	colonies	and	revenues	from	trade	services	had	collapsed.	
Spain	could	still	borrow	abroad	for	a	while.	After	1834	short	term	bills	–	mainly	from	
France	‐	multiplied	the	nominal	volume	of	external	debt.	It	was	already	20	times	larger	
than	in	1821	and	it	grew	50	%	further	in	the	subsequent	fifteen	years	(Sardá	Dexeus	1948)	
p	60,	90).	Established	in	1829	on	the	remains	of	the	failed	Banco	de	San	Carlos,	the	Banco	
de	San	Fernando	‐with	limited	large	operations	confined	to	Madrid‐	issued	notes	to	lend	to	
the	government	without	building	equivalent	metallic	reserves.	(Tedde,	1994,	30,	Sarda,	
1948,	32).	The	bank	assisted	the	government	during	the	Carlista	war	and	it	helped	further	
with	an	extraordinary	expansion	of	notes	without	reserves	–	as	fiduciary	money	in	1844‐
47	(Tedde	1994	table	1.4,	Sarda,	1948,	94).	It	was	merged	with	the	Banco	de	Isabel	II	in	
1847	which	had	multiplied	its	issues	even	more.	Funding	the	government	debt	represented	
60‐70%	of	the	bank’s	assets	and	crippled	the	peculiar	banking	system	of	the	country	as	
Tedde	has	painstakingly	described.	Unsurprisingly	lending	to	private	business	was	
minimal.	Yet,	the	financial	reform	and	creation	of	Banco	de	España	in	the	1850s	did	not	end	
the	recourse	to	finance	debt	by	monetary	means;	it	will	turn	into	open	inflationary	finance	
policy	later	in	1883	with	the	inconvertibility	of	the	peseta	(Martin	Acena	1981	).	
Thus,	recurrent	deficits	were	increasingly	financed	with	debt	(which	was	often	re‐
structured)	or	money	creation	when	both	foreign	and	domestic	lenders	exhausted;	In	some	
countries	the	last	resort	eventually	was	money	creation	by	means	of	rigging	the	banks	like	
in	1840s	Spain,	debasing	the	currency	as	in	1830s	Mexico	or	1850s	Bolivia	or	just	printing	
fiat	money	as	in	Buenos	Aires	since	1826	(Mitre	1986);	(Tedde	1999;	Irigoin	2000;	Centeno	
2002),	(Torres	Medina	1998).This	also	triggered	a	remarkable	change	in	monetary	policy	
with	lasting	impact:	the	expansion	of		currency	to	meet	fiscal	disequilibrium	opened	an	
early	door	to	governments	to	use	money	as	a	fiscal	instrument.	Hence	depreciated	
exchange	rates	provided	also	additional	protection	and	stimulated	the	production	of	some	
exports	–	especially	when	international	prices	were	falling	‐	despite	scholar	insistence	on	
the	importance	of	tariffs	throughout	the	19th	century	(Coatsworth	and	Williamson	2004).	
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Effects	from	the	monetization	of	the	deficit	further	disintegrated	money	markets	and	
exacerbated	regional	and	political	tensions	within	a	formerly	integrated	monetary	union.	
According	to	Spanish	monetary	historians	a	‘contradictory’	monetary	policy	particularly	
after	1823	failed	to	attract	specie	to	the	mint	(Sarda,	1948),	imposing	substantial	
deflationary	effects	to	the	Spanish	economy	((Sardá	Dexeus	1947),	(Nogues‐Marco	
2005)for	a	qualification)	.	Throughout	a	systematic	–	but	unexplained‐	overvaluation	of	the	
silver	drove	specie	out	of	circulation;	e.g,	the	gold/silver	exchange	rate	was	1:15.2	in	UK,	
15.5	in	France	and	16.5	even	16.7	in	Spain,	so	‘Spanish	coins	were	hence	hoarded	or	
exported	en	masse’.	Thus	insufficient	circulating	medium	sustained	demand	for	lesser	
quality	French	coins	for	decades.	Liberal	governments	hoped	to	revert	this	early	in	the	
1820s	without	success.	The	1824	Restoration’	monetary	policy	was	notoriously	prejudicial	
and	the	flight	‘of	pesos	duros	or	fuertes’	continued	despite	large	foreign	loans.	Deflation	was	
significant	up	to	1830	but	continued	through	the	1840s	(Carreras	2005)(Table	16.9	p	
1288‐90)	despite	the	reopening	of	the	Barcelona	mint	and	renewed	coinage	in	Madrid	
(Sarda,	1948	80‐88).		Then	even	other	foreign	coins,	Mexicans	and	Portuguese,	entered	in	
circulation	for	greater	disorder.	However,	without	means	governments	were	unlikely	to	
run	effectively	a	mint	or	any	policy	on	foreign	exchange,	so	low	coinage	it	is	no	wonder.	
Yet	it	is	unclear	which	were	the	Spanish	silver	coins	that	were	dominant	in	circulation;	
according	to	Sarda	(p	67)	these	were	pesos	‘fuertes	of	duros’	with	higher	intrinsic	silver	
value	than	French	coins,	and	were	most	likely	good	Spanish	American	pesos.		As	in	Peru,	
and	elsewhere,	from	the	mid‐	1820s	to	the	mid‐	1830s	good	silver	coins	were	siphoned	off	
given	their	appreciation	in	France,	Britain	and	even	more	so	in	the	traditional	Asian	
markets.	Deflation	was	a	common	trait	in	these	economies	(Gootenberg	1990).	In	some	
silver	rich	countries	several	mints	appeared	and	cut	coins	of	various	qualities	–	some	of	
which	reasonably	should	have	ended	in	Spain	(Irigoin	2009	).	In	circulation	along	with	the	
francesas,	Gresham	effects	occurred	and	arguably	resulted	in	deflationary		consequences	as	
those	described	by	Sarda.	Notably	the	exchange	rate	of	sterling	and	the	French	franc	
remained	relatively	stable	throughout	the	period	1821‐1855	–	with	exceptional	blips	in	
1847	(Tedde	1999	table	V‐2	and	XI‐3),	(Prados	de	la	Escosura	1986)app	7.	As	the	banking	
system	was,	the	markets	for	money	and	exchange	were	highly	fragmented	adding	further	
transaction	costs	to	the	already	weak	integration	of	the	Spanish	domestic	economy	
(Nogues‐Marco	2015).			
Research	on	the	macroeconomic	situation	of	Spain	in	this	period	is	still	a	work	in	progress	
but	evidence	from	very	detailed	narratives	presents	the	problems	of	Spain	very	similar	in	
nature	to	those	of	her	former	colonies.	Whereas	in	some	parts	of	Spanish	America	inflation	
was	an	optimal	solution	to	debt	finances	in	times	of	war	(Bordo	and	Vegh	2002);	it	
continued	being	a	source	in	peaceful	times	and	for	economies	with	very	different	
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endowments	and	institutions	–	like	Bolivia	or	Buenos	Aires	still	by	the	1850s	(Irigoin	
2009).	The	lack	of	consensus	about	the	form	of	the	state,	about	the	sources	of	revenues	and	
the	liable	subjects,		and	the	disassociation	between	tax	collectors	and	bearers,	all	
contributed	to	a	very	low	collection	rate,	a	shallow	fiscal	base	and	ultimately	to	insufficient	
revenues.	In	a	political	regime	in	which	representation	bore	no	relation	with	taxation,	
governments	became	insolvent;	lacking	fiscal	capacity	or	legitimacy	(often	both),	taxation	
ought	to	happen	without	consent.		
	
Another	legacy	
Institutionalist	interpretations	of	Latin	American	long	run	development	customarily	assess	
her	performance	against	the	United	States’.	However,	the	political	and	fiscal	trajectories	of	
Spain’s	and	Britain’s	former	colonies	after	their	Independence	were	hardly	comparable.	As	
historian	Max	Edling	(Edling	2003)	rightly	explains,	the	revolution	in	the	British	colonies	
was	‘in	the	favour	of	government’,	not	‘against	the	government’	as	precisely	was	the	case	in	
the	Spanish	colonies.	This	difference	makes	the	comparison	of	their	respective	institutional	
paths	quite	problematic.	Moreover	considering	that	both	Spain	and	her	former	colonies	
were	in	similar	predicament	after	Independence	it	is	difficult	to	assign	it	as	a	prejudice	
from	the	colonial	legacy.	Under	British	rule	North	American	colonies	were	also	separated	
fiscal	and	political	units;	but	they	were	financed	by	a	metropolis	which	took	on	its	defence	
and	minimal	government	expenses.	Unlike	the	Spanish	settlements,	where	the	church	
provided	most	of	public	goods	with	substantial	funding	from	the	royal	purse,	the	British	
colonies	funded	public	goods	such	as	education	with	direct	taxes	raised	locally.	When	the	
French	Indian	War	in	the	1750s	and	1760s	demanded	further	revenues	–	or	to	the	colonies	
to	bear	part	of	the	fiscal	costs	‐	Parliament	met	fierce	resistance	to	further	(indirect)	
consumption	taxes	required	from	the	colonists23.	This	asymmetry	between	taxation	and	
representation	that	the	colonies	had	in	parliament	triggered	the	American	Revolution	and	
tax	resistance	continued	until	the	1790s.		
The	British	levied	direct	taxes	on	colonial	property	and	faculty	from	as	early	as	166024;	
however	no	comparable	taxes	were	charged	in	the	metropolis	where	direct	taxes	increased	
only	after	1792.	In	parliamentary	England	sources	of	direct	taxation	–mainly	land	‐had	
been	in	relative	decline	since	the	1690s.	For	most	of	the	18th	century	custom	and	excise	
made	the	bulk	of	her	revenues	(Ashworth	2003).	Apparently	the	fiscal	burden	was	low	in	
                                                            
23	The	Townshend	Act	followed	the	(repealed)	Stamp	Act,	the	Sugar	Act	and	others	sought	to	raise	revenue	in	
the	colonies	for	self‐maintenance.	It	culminated	with	the	Tea	Act	of	1773	and	protests	in	Boston.			
24	Faculty	taxes	were	levied	on	the	faculty	or	earning	capacity	or	persons	following	certain	trades	or	having	
certain	skills.		G.	Fisher,	History	of	Property	Taxes	in	the	US.	http://Eh.net/encyclopedia/history	–of‐property‐
taxes‐in‐the‐united‐states	accessed	on	3rd	January	2015		
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the	British	colonies	–	and	certainly	much	lower	than	in	the	metropolis.	However,	as	Zolt	
shows	‘representation	came	at	a	cost’	to	independent	US:	from	1792	to	1811	the	per	capita	
tax	take	increased	10	times	from	what	the	Empire	had	charged	in	1765‐1775.	(Zolt,	2009,	
455).	Direct	taxes	collected	by	local	government	did	not	cease	with	the	revolution	and	their	
income	represented	a	substantial	part	of	the	revenues	available	to	the	new	state	
governments.	By	1825	the	total	tax	take	of	the	US	government	was	$	4.33	per	person	of	
which	54%	corresponded	to	income	appropriated	by	the	state	and	local	governments	(Zolt,	
2009	table	1).		It	jumped	to	$	8.86	in	1855,	which	meant	more	than	double	in	real	terms	of	
the	1825	value25.	This	burden	was	certainly	much	higher	than	the	per	capita	contribution	
borne	by	Spanish	Americans	as	seen	in	table	426.		
This	growth	includes	the	extraordinary	fiscal	expansion	of	the	Federalist	period.	Only	in	
1787‐89	the	Philadelphia	Convention	incorporated	the	former	colonies	into	a	federal	
United	States	transforming	the	equal	representation	of	states	in	the	Continental	Congress	
for	the	proportional	representation	of	citizens	in	the	House	of	Representatives.		This	
political	experiment,	the	Confederation	in	which	Congress	took	the	governing	role	the	King,	
had	collapsed	under	the	compound	of	insolvency	and	currency	inflation	in	1782‐8827	
(Edling	2014).	As	part	of	the	Federalist	fiscal	program	the	federal	government	assumed	the	
debt	of	the	individual	states	and	paid	them	at	par	with	new	federal	public	bonds;	this	
significantly	relieved	the	state	governments	of	the	cost	of	the	transition	to	a	new	political	
order.	In	1790,	seventy	four	million	dollars’	worth	of	domestic	and	foreign	debt	–	about	
30%	of	GNP28	‐	were	consolidated	in	long	term	interest	bearing	bonds	which	the	federal	
government	serviced	regularly	with	revenues	from	trade	taxes.	Having	been	part	of	the	
fiscal	burden	levied	by	the	British,	the	US	government	appropriated	what	formerly	
belonged	to	the	empire.	The	tariff	was	a	prerogative	the	states	surrendered	to	the	federal	
government	by	the	Impost	Acts	of	1790.	Together	with	some	low	excise	taxes	on	alcohol,	
tobacco	and	sugar,	the	tariff	thereafter	made	70‐80%	of	the	federal	income	in	the	period.	
Customs	revenues	amounted	to	$	4.6	million	in	1792	(about	2%	of	GNP)	or	$1.36	per	
capita;	in	nominal	terms	they	doubled	by	1800,	tripled	by	1805	and	further	quadrupled	by	
1820.	By	1850,	the	tariff	at	$	39	million	–	or	$1.98	per	capita	‐	still	made	82%	of	the	federal	
revenues	(Finances	1870).		
                                                            
25	According	to	the	US	dollar	purchasing	power	www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/reativevalue.php	
accessed	Feb	6th	2015.	The	annualised	inflation	rate	in	the	period	was	‐0.45%	
26	The	US	dollar	and	the	Spanish	American	silver	peso	remained	legal	tender	at	par	until	1856.	
27	The	Constitutional	Convention	alienated	the	rights	to	coin	or	print	money	from	the	state	and	gave	the	
power	to	coin	to	the	federal	government	in	1792.	It	also	changed	the	states’	for	proportional	representation	
in	Congress.	
28	Of	the	$74million,	$12	to	$22	million	corresponded	to	the	states	debt.	GNP	and	Debt	data	from	Bordo,	M.	
and	C.	Vegh	(2002).	"What	if	Alexander	Hamilton	had	been	Argentinean?	A	comparison	of	the	early	monetary	
experiences	of	Argentina	and	the	United	States."	Journal	of	Monetary	Economics	49(3):	459‐494.	
	 .			
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What	sets	the	Federalist	and	Republican	programs	apart	from	the	Latin	American	fiscal	
reforms	‐	and	from	the	previous	disastrous	experience	of	the	Confederation‐	is	the	
extraordinary	capacity	the	federal	state	had	to	service	the	interest	and	principal	of	its	debt	
(Wallis	2000).	This	capacity	to	tax	was	not	available	to	governments	in	Spanish	America	–	
nor	in	Spain‐	not	because	of	the	type	of	levies,	but	because	governments	there	could	not	
establish	a	taxation	system	that	worked.	North	Americans	eventually	agreed	to	shoulder	
heavier	taxes	than	under	British	rule	(Edling,	2003,	156).	The	per	capita	burden	calculated	
by	tax	take	of	the	three	levels	of	government	combined	had	doubled	in	1855	from	the	per	
capita	contribution	of	1820,	meanwhile	population	had	tripled.	(Zolt,	2009	p	458).	So	even	
if	the	US,	like	Latin	American	republics,	relied	on	Customs	to	service	the	debt	the	argument	
about	the	colonial	fiscal	burden	in	the	case	of	Spanish	America	needs	some	closer	scrutiny	
to	substantiate.		
Prados	(2009)	explains	the	extremely	different	success	of	the	financial	origin	of	republics	
in	the	Americas	by	the	recurrence	of	deficits.	Latin	American	already	weak	governments	
were	further	prejudiced	by	vicious	circles	of	insolvency,	debt	and	inflation.	Indeed	the	
problem	was	the	impossibility	to	raise	debt	because	they	were	no	credible	payers29.	But	by	
looking	solely	at	the	federal	level	scholars	tend	not	to	see	the	real	size	of	the	fiscal	burden	
borne	by	the	US	taxpayer.	Considering	that	the	federal	burden	was	half	or	less	of	what	the	
three	levels	of	government	take	was,	it	means	that	there	was	a	significant	amount	of	money	
still	appropriated	by	local	and	state	treasuries.	This	income	was	originated	in	direct	taxes	
and,	more	importantly,	it	was	spent	on	education	and	infrastructure;	something	which	no	
fiscal	district	in	Spanish	America	was	remotely	able	to	dream	of	as	the	overwhelming	share	
of	expenses	went	to	war	(Centeno	2002)	
Spanish	American	(aspiring)	governments	in	capital	cities	were	charging	taxpayers	
elsewhere	with	indirect	trade	taxes;	the	latter	had	not	vote	or	say	on	the	spending	of	these	
revenues;	nor	there	were	channels	for	redistribution	as	the	transfers	that	had	formerly	
allowed	the	co‐optation	of	regional	elites	‐	even	if	for	marginally	productive	ventures.	
Indirect	taxation	without	representation	was	the	means	that	republican	governments	had	
to	establish	their	authority	at	the	centre	and	at	the	top	of	the	polity	in	Spanish	America.	For	
taxpayers	the	burden	was	greater	if	a	government	elsewhere	controlled	the	Custom	house	
at	the	port	or	the	tobacco	monopoly	–	as	in	landlocked	capitals	like	Bogota,	Mexico	and	
Santiago	de	Chile.	Relief	from	colonial	tax	burden	was	none	for	the	people	overall	–	if	any	it	
was	appropriated	by	elites	at	the	capital	cities	who	increasingly	restricted	political	
representation	of	territories	and	individuals.	Unsurprisingly	fiscal	federalism	failed.	
                                                            
29	The	Empire	of	Brazil	adds	an	interesting	twist	to	institutional	explanations	about	the	role	of	limited	
government	and	political	institutions	in	providing	secure	property	rights	and	hence	growth.		Summerhill,	W.	
(2015	(forthcoming)).	Inglorious	revolution:	political	institutions,	sovereign	debt,	and	financial	
underdevelopment	in	imperial	Brazil.	New	Haven,	Yale	University	Press.	
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Whereas	in	the	federal	US	some	states	even	invested	in	banks,	turnpike	and	canals	
construction	through	private	public	partnership	and	taxed	profits	from	banks	and	
insurance	companies	and	capital	gains	on	these	stocks	(Sylla	1999)	266.		Thus	some	states	
managed	to	fund	up	to	60	%	of	their	expenses	and	participated	of	the	greater	fiscal	capacity	
of	the	federal	state	which	relieved	them	from	the	old	debts.	The	federal	government	also	
shared	revenues	from	land	sales	and	taxes	on	businesses.	Furthermore	in	New	England	
these	revenues	were	sufficient	to	enable	some	reduction	or	elimination	of	state	property	
taxes	early	on.			
Scholars	have	shown	the	importance	of	state	revenues	for	the	provision	of	public	education	
in	the	US	(Go	and	Lindert	2007);	by	1820	the	Common	School	achieved	the	best	literacy	
rate	in	the	world	thanks	to	income	from	direct	taxes	invested	in	education	serving	a	broad	
population.	There	were	significant	regional	variations	among	states	however.	Zolt	argues	
that	this	explains	the	different	type	of	taxes	chosen	to	support	public	education	spending,	
and	hence	inequality	levels	within	the	US	(Zolt,	2009(Lindert	2004)).	Elsewhere	Sokoloff	
and	Zolt	have	related	this	to	the	contemporary	extension	of	the	franchise	in	the	US	
(Sokoloff	and	Zolt	2006)	179).	They	thus	explain	the	different	growth	performance	in	
South	and	North	America	in	the	provision	of	education	resultant	from	the	legacy	of	
inequality	that	taxation	imposed	in	each	part	of	the	continent.	The	channel,	they	argue,	was	
suffrage	institutions.	Thus,	allegedly	North	Americans	had	a	less	restricted	franchise,	
greater	turnout	at	the	ballots	and	a	vigorous	primary	education	funded	by	direct	taxation.		
Latin	Americans,	on	the	other	hand,	increasingly	had	more	restricted	franchise,	lower	
turnout	and	did	not	–	and	could	not‐	invest	in	education	to	account	for	(Curvale	and	
Przeworski	2008).	However,	only	the	Fifteenth	Amendment	to	the	Constitution	in	1870	
granted	all	US	male	citizens	the	right	to	vote;	and	most	blacks	were	yet	disenfranchised,	
banned	or	discriminated	at	the	ballots	until	the	Voting	Rights	Act	of	1965	made	suffrage	
universal.	Ironically	until	1964	five	southern	states	used	the	payment	of	poll	tax	as	
requirement	to	vote,	which	was	repealed	by	the	Twenty	Fourth	Amendment	–	yet	eight	
states	have	not	ratified	it	to	date.		
Notwithstanding,	Spanish	Americans	were	not	originally	precluded	from	voting	and	had	
significant	means	for	investing	in	education	at	their	disposal	–	at	the	rate	they	controlled	
the	colonial	treasuries.	Furthermore	every	early	constitutional	text	aimed	at	it.	However	
asymmetries	between	agents	deciding	collection	and	spending	of	revenues	from	mainly	
indirect	taxes	rendered	paltry	yields	to	the	Treasury.	Direct	taxation	in	the	US	proved	also	
an	advantage	for	more	equal,	better	educated,	societies	(in	some	states)	because	as	Zolt	
points	out	‘where	the	median	voter	has	less	income	than	the	mean,	the	median	voter	will	
favour	income	tax	regimes	under	which	her	share	of	taxes	will	be	less	than	their	share	of	
government	benefit	supported	by	the	tax	revenue’	(2009,	449).	This	theorem	may	not	work	
if	the	median	voter	pays	indirect	taxes	of	which	moreover	rates	are	decided	elsewhere	and	
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revenues	are	disinvested	from	public	goods	to	service	debt	or	eroded	by	inflation.		This	was	
the	situation	in	republican	Spanish	America,	where	a	substantial	provision	of	public	goods	
was	done	by	private	sources	like	the	church	and	charities	and	so	not	perceived	as	return	
for	taxation.	Similarly	a	number	of	private	goods	were	provided	by	public	sources	which	
made	the	‘developmentalism’	of	the	colonial	state;	thus	employment,	food	security	and	a	
host	of	subsidies	to	private	activities	were	then	understood	as	entitlements30.	In	this	case	
the	median	voter	would	dissociate	the	identity	between	revenue	and	expenditure	and	may	
unreasonably	prefer	lower	taxation	to	fund	lower	expenditure	–	if	there	were	no	real	
redistributive	effects	to	hope	for.		
	
Conclusions	
Weakened	governments	could	not	tax,	without	income	they	could	not	last	and	they	yet	had	
to	spend	ever	more	to	remain	in	power.	Political	instability	was	rooted	in	the	fiscal	fragility	
of	the	state	and	every	new	constitution	faltered	as	fast	as	the	previous	one.	Paradoxically	in	
Spanish	America,	instead	of	relieving	the	burden	from	the	colonial	taxation,	Independence	
weakened	yet	more	the	capacities	–fiscal,	legal	and	administrative‐	of	the	republican	state	
and	undermined	the	political	institutions	that	it	organized.		Over	time	–	because	of	inelastic	
expenses	from	political	turmoil	on	top	of	growing	demands	on	future	income	from	debt	
and	prejudices	from	monetary	disorder	‐	all	compounded	in	chronic	fiscal	deficits	and	
broken	governments.	Fiscal	basis	were	shallow	and	shrinking	as	countries	lost	import	or	
consumption	capacity	from	exchange	rate	problems	and	disintegrating	domestic	markets.	
Borrowing	further	at	shorter	terms	and	higher	interest	rates	led	governments	such	as	of	
Mexico’s	to	real	bankruptcy	within	30	years	(Tenembaun	1996,	Irigoin,	2009).	Other	
governments	with	even	lower	fiscal	capacity	inflated	their	debts	by	monetary	expansion	
like	Bolivia’s,	or	suffered	from	the	impossibility	to	execute	any	monetary	policy,	as	Spain	or	
Peru	until	the	1850s.	The	lack	of	consensus	about	the	form	of	the	state,	about	its	fiscal	basis	
and	the	disassociation	between	tax	collectors	and	bearers	ultimately	undermined	the	
capacities	of	the	(any)	state.	The	incidence	of	regressive	taxation	on	producers	(exporters)	
and	consumers	originated	large	redistribution	effects	which	further	aggravated	centrifugal	
tensions.			
Without	fiscal	capacity	neither	debt	service	nor	tax	smoothing	was	possible	for	Latin	
American	governments.	Lack	of	fiscal	capacity	and	regressive	taxation	had	persistent	
implications	in	the	making	of	the	republican	state.	For	instance	the	first	Mexican	
                                                            
30	The	‘developmentalist’	state	in	Spanish	America	is	explained	in	(Grafe	Irigoin	2012).	It	differs	substantially	
from	the	developmental	state	conceived	by	Robinson,	J.	and	S.	Pincus	(2015).	"Wars	and	State	Making	
Reconsidered:	The	Rise	of	the	Developmental	State."	Annales	Histoire,	Sciences	Sociales.	
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constitution	of	1824	devised	a	mechanism	to	incorporate	formerly	separate	19	treasury	
districts	into	a	federal	republic.		It	was	meant	to	be	a	compromise	between	states	and	
ayuntamientos	to	fund	the	fiscal	reorganization	of	the	new	federation.	Replicating	Cadiz’	
article	340	the	Mexican	congress	apportioned	each	state	contribution	by	a	poorly	defined	
combination	of	population	size	and	consumption,	ie.	The	Contingente.	The	political	
bargaining	was	extremely	difficult	and	returns	foundered	shortly:	they	made	24%	of	
federal	revenues	in	1824	and	originated	in	the	same	mining	regions	that	had	formerly	
transferred	large	shares	of	their	revenues	to	the	colonial	capital,	but	without	vote	or	voice	
(Arroyo	2006).	It	fell	to	a	10%	in	the	following	years	and	collapsed	further	to	3%	in	1831	
when	contributions	ceased;	meanwhile	total	revenues	of	the	federal	government	nearly	
halved.	Conversely,	in	the	US	when	in	needs	for	war	expenses	as	in	1812	the	federal	
government	could	temporarily	raise	an	extraordinary	federal	property	tax	among	the	
states	on	the	basis	of	population	to	great	effect.		Underpinning	the	failure	of	Mexican	fiscal	
federalism	–	comparable	to	other	experiments	in	Spanish	America	‐	was	the	protracted	
conflict	about	the	sources	of	national	revenues	and	the	form	of	the	state.		
In	the	process,	restrictions	to	suffrage	mounted	with	wealth	and	literacy	requirements	
throughout	Spanish	America;	elections	evolved	into	a	form	of	proclamation	of	every	new	
government	more	than	actually	an	organized	and	fair	competition	for	power.	The	early	
open	contest	for	the	popular	will	ran	out	of	funds	soon;	henceforth	governments	traded	
entitlements	for	support.	Political	strife	moved	from	the	ballots	to	the	battleground,	and	
further	to	the	streets.	Suffrage	lost	its	nature.	With	an	hoc	elections	representative	
democracy	in	Spanish	America	moved	one	step	towards	what	scholars	calls	a	‘Delegative	
Democracy’	(O'Donnell	1994)	as	opposed	to	a	representative	one.		In	this	environment	
there	were	no	effective	means	to	fund	governance	and	far	less	to	deliver	the	constitutional	
promises	of	public	education.		As	governments	resorted	to	even	more	perverse	means	to	
defray	expenses,	like	selling	massively	lands	at	once	when	relative	its	price	was	rising	from	
greater	labour	ratios	and	higher	prices	for	land	intensive	commodities	from	globalization,	
they	only	accelerated	already	high	levels	of	inequality.	Thus	in	19th	century	Spanish	
America	–	and	in	Spain‐	inequality	is	the	by‐product	of	another	institutional	legacy	other	
than	colonial	status.		Elites	on	the	other	hand	managed	to	deter	both	greater	fiscal	
extraction	from	governments	and	institutional	demands	for	political	redistribution	from	
fellow	citizens.	Fiscal	reforms	were	ineffectual	or	null	and	representation	was	increasingly	
more	restrictive.	Low	taxation	was	in	their	interest	as	they	could	acquire	public	goods	
privately.	For	the	masses	the	expectation	–	and	experience‐	of	public	provision	of	private	
goods	put	governments	in	the	position	of	continuous	patronage	in	order	to	buy	out	their	
legitimacy,	irrespective	of	the	financial	means	available.	Insolvency,	inflation	and	instability	
are	long	term	features	in	these	countries,	together	with	regressive	fiscal	policies.		Placing	
the	fiscal	burden	on	others	or	in	the	future	brought	elites	and	masses	together			in	a	
perverse	combination	of	low	taxation	and	representation.	This	intertemporal	trap	of	the	
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peculiar	Latin	American	political	and	macroeconomic	(dis)equilibrium	seems	to	be	indeed	
more	a	legacy	of	the	19th	century.		
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Sardá	Dexeus,	J.	(1947).	"Spanish	Prices	in	the	Nineteenth	Century."	The	Quarterly	Journal	
of	Economics	62(1):	143‐159.	
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